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Abstract
One-time memories (OTM’s) are simple, tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be
used to implement sophisticated functionalities such as one-time programs. Can one construct OTM’s
whose security follows from some physical principle? This is not possible in a fully-classical world,
or in a fully-quantum world, but there is evidence that OTM’s can be built using “isolated qubits”
— qubits that cannot be entangled, but can be accessed using adaptive sequences of single-qubit
measurements.
Here we present new constructions for OTM’s using isolated qubits, which improve on previ-
ous work in several respects: they achieve a stronger “single-shot” security guarantee, which is
stated in terms of the (smoothed) min-entropy; they are proven secure against adversaries who can
perform arbitrary local operations and classical communication (LOCC); and they are efficiently
implementable.
These results use Wiesner’s idea of conjugate coding, combined with error-correcting codes that
approach the capacity of the q-ary symmetric channel, and a high-order entropic uncertainty relation,
which was originally developed for cryptography in the bounded quantum storage model.
1 Introduction
One-time memories (OTM’s) are a simple type of tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware. An
OTM has the following behavior: a user Alice can write two messages s and t into the OTM, and
then give the OTM to another user Bob; Bob can then choose to read either s or t from the OTM,
but he can only learn one of the two messages, not both. A single OTM is not especially exciting by
itself, but when many OTM’s are combined in an appropriate way, they can be used to implement
one-time programs, which are a powerful form of secure computation [3, 4, 5, 6]. (Roughly speaking,
a one-time program is a program that can be run exactly once, on an input chosen by the user.
After running once, the program “self-destructs,” and it never reveals any information other than
the output of the computation.)
Can one construct OTM’s whose security follows from some physical principle? At first glance,
the answer seems to be “no.” OTM’s cannot exist in a fully classical world, because information
can always be copied without destroying it. One might hope to build OTM’s in a quantum world,
where the no-cloning principle limits an adversary’s ability to copy an unknown quantum state.
However, this is also impossible, because an OTM can be used to perform oblivious transfer with
information-theoretic security, which is ruled out by various “no-go” theorems [7, 8, 9, 10].
One way around these no-go theorems is to try to construct protocols that are secure against
restricted classes of quantum adversaries, e.g., adversaries who can only perform k-local measure-
ments [11], or adversaries who only have bounded or noisy quantum storage [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
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More recently, Liu has proposed a construction for OTM’s in the isolated qubits model [1], where the
adversary is only allowed to perform local operations and classical communication (LOCC). That is,
the adversary can perform single-qubit quantum operations, including single-qubit measurements,
and can make adaptive choices based on the classical information returned by these measurements;
but the adversary cannot perform entangling operations on sets of two or more qubits. (Honest
parties are also restricted to LOCC operations.) The isolated qubits model is motivated by recent
experimental work using solid-state qubits, such as nitrogen vacancy (NV) centers; see [1] for a more
complete discussion of this model, and [18] for earlier work on implementing quantum money using
NV centers. 1
In this paper we show a new construction and security analysis for OTM’s in the isolated qubits
model, which improves on the results of [1] in several respects. First, we show a stronger “single-
shot” security guarantee, which is stated in terms of the (smoothed) min-entropy [19, 20]. This
shows that a constant fraction of the message bits remain hidden from the adversary. This stronger
statement is necessary for most cryptographic applications; note that the previous results of [1] were
not sufficient, as they used the Shannon entropy.
Second, we prove security against general LOCC adversaries, who can perform arbitrary measure-
ments (including weak measurements), and can measure each qubit multiple times. This improves
on the results of [1], which only showed security against 1-pass LOCC adversaries that use 2-outcome
measurements. Our new security proof is based solely on the definition of the isolated qubits model,
without any additional assumptions.
Third, we show a construction of OTM’s that is efficiently implementable, i.e., programming and
reading out the OTM can be done in polynomial time. This improves on the construction in [1],
which was primarily an information-theoretic result, using random error-correcting codes that did
not allow efficient decoding. (In fact, our new construction is quite flexible, and does not depend
heavily on the choice of a particular error-correcting code. Our OTM’s can be constructed using
any code that satisfies two simple requirements: the code must be linear over GF (2), and it must
approach the capacity of the q-ary symmetric channel. We show one such code in this paper; several
more sophisticated constructions are known [22, 23, 24].)
We will describe our OTM construction in the following section. Here, we briefly comment
on some related work. Note that OTM’s cannot make use of standard techniques such as privacy
amplification. This is because OTM’s are non-interactive and asynchronous: all of the communication
between Alice and Bob occurs at the beginning, while the adversary can wait until later to attack
the OTM. (To do privacy amplification, Alice would have to first force the adversary to take some
action, and then send one more message to Bob. This trick is very natural in protocols for quantum
key distribution and oblivious transfer, but it is clearly impossible in the case of an OTM.) As we
will see below, the security of our OTM’s follows from rather different arguments. (A similar issue
was studied recently in [17], albeit with a weaker, non-adaptive adversary.)
In addition, it is a long-standing open problem to prove strong upper-bounds on the power of
LOCC operations. Previous results in this area include demonstrations of “nonlocality without
entanglement” [25] (see [26] for a recent survey), and constructions of data-hiding states [27, 28, 29,
30]. Our OTM’s are not directly comparable to these earlier results, as the security requirements for
our OTM’s are quite different.
1.1 Our construction
We now describe our OTM construction, which is based on Wiesner’s idea of conjugate coding [21].
Our OTM will store two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and will use n lg q qubits, where q is a (large)
power of 2. Let C : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}n lg q be any error-correcting code that satisfies the following
two requirements: C is linear over GF (2), and C approaches the capacity of the q-ary symmetric
1 Note that the devices constructed in [1], and in this paper, are more precisely described as leaky OTM’s, because they
can leak additional information to the adversary. It is not known whether such leaky OTM’s are sufficient to construct
one-time programs as defined in [3]. We will discuss this issue in Section 1.2; for now, we will simply refer to our devices
as OTM’s.
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channel Eq with error probability pe := 12 − 12q (where the channel treats each block of lg q bits as a
single q-ary symbol). Note that, when q is large, the capacity of the channel Eq is roughly 1 − pe,
which is roughly 12 , so we have n lg q ≈ 2ℓ.
Given two messages s and t, let C(s) and C(t) be the corresponding codewords, and view each
codeword as n blocks consisting of lg q bits. We prepare the qubits in the OTM as follows. For each
i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
• Let γi ∈ {0, 1} be the outcome of a fair and independent coin toss.
• If γi = 0, prepare the i’th block of qubits in the standard basis state corresponding to the i’th
block of C(s).
• If γi = 1, prepare the i’th block of qubits in the Hadamard basis state corresponding to the
i’th block of C(t).
To recover the first message s, we measure every qubit in the standard basis, which yields a
string of measurement outcomes z ∈ {0, 1}n lg q, and then we run the decoding algorithm for C. To
recover the second message t, we measure every qubit in the Hadamard basis, then follow the same
procedure. It is easy to see that all of these procedures require only single-qubit state preparations
and single-qubit measurements, which are allowed in the isolated qubits model. 2
(We remark that this OTM construction uses blocks of qubits, rather than individual qubits as
in [21] and [1]. That is, we set q large, instead of using q = 2. This difference seems to help our
security proof, although it is not clear whether it affects the actual security of the scheme.)
We now sketch the proofs of correctness and security for this OTM. With regard to correctness,
note that an honest player who wanted to learn s will obtain measurement outcomes that have the
same distribution as the output of the q-ary symmetric channel Eq acting on C(s); hence the decoding
algorithm will return s. A similar argument holds for t.
To prove security, we consider adversaries that make separable measurements (which include
LOCC measurements as a special case). The basic idea is to consider the distribution of the messages
s and t, conditioned on one particular measurement outcome z obtained by the adversary. Since the
adversary is separable, the corresponding POVM elementMz will be a tensor product of single-qubit
operators
⊗n lg q
a=1 Ra (up to normalization). Now, one can imagine a fictional adversary that measures
the qubits one at a time, and happens to observe this same string of single-qubit measurement
outcomes R1, R2, . . . , Rn lg q. This event leads to the same conditional distribution of s and t. But
the fictional adversary is easier to analyze, because it is non-adaptive, it measures each qubit only
once, and the measurements can be done in arbitrary order.
Now, our proof will be based on the following intuition. In order to learn both messages s and
t, the adversary will want to determine the basis choices γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn), so that he will know
which blocks of qubits should be measured in the standard basis, and which blocks of qubits should
be measured in the Hadamard basis. The choice of the code C is crucial to prevent the adversary
from doing this; for instance, if the adversary could predict some of the bits in the codewords C(s)
and C(t), he could then measure the corresponding qubits, and gain some information about which
bases were used to prepare them. (Note moreover that the adversary has full knowledge of C, before
he measures any of the qubits.) We will argue that certain properties of the code C prevent the
adversary from learning these basis choices γ perfectly, and that this in turn limits the adversary’s
knowledge of the messages s and t.
2 We note in passing that Winter’s “gentle measurement lemma” [31] does not imply an attack on this OTM using
LOCC operations. The idea behind the gentle measurement lemma is that, if there is a nondestructive measurement that
recovers s with high probability, and there is a similar measurement for t, then one can perform both measurements, and
recover both s and t with high probability.
However, the LOCC measurement that recovers s is destructive, as is the LOCC measurement for t. This is because one
has to perform a projective measurement on each qubit, obtain a string of classical measurement outcomes, and then run
the classical decoding algorithm for C. In order to use the gentle measurement lemma, one would have to perform these
measurements nondestructively, which would require running the decoding algorithm for C on a superposition of many
different inputs; and this would require entangling operations.
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Since C is a linear code over GF (2), it has a generator matrix G, which has rank ℓ. Thus there
must exist a subset of ℓ bits of the codeword C(s) that look uniformly random, assuming the message
s was chosen uniformly at random; and a similar statement holds for C(t). Now, let A be the subset
of ℓ qubits that encode these bits of C(s) and C(t). We can imagine that the fictional adversary
happens to measure these qubits first. Therefore, during these first ℓ steps, the fictional adversary
learns nothing about which bases had been used to prepare the state, i.e., the basis choices γ are
independent of the fictional adversary’s measurement outcomes.
One can then show that the conditional distribution of s and t after these first ℓ steps of the
fictional adversary is related to the distribution of measurement outcomes when the state
⊗
a∈ARa
is measured in a random basis. This kind of situation has been studied previously, in connection
with cryptography in the bounded quantum storage model. In particular, we can use a high-order
entropic uncertainty relation from [16] to show a lower-bound on the smoothed min-entropy of this
distribution. We then use trivial bounds to analyze the remaining n lg q − ℓ steps of the fictional
adversary. Roughly speaking, we get a bound of the form:
Hε∞(S, T |Z) & 12 ℓ, (1)
for any separable adversary (where Z denotes the adversary’s measurement outcome). Thus, while
the OTM may leak some information, it still hides a constant fraction of the bits of the messages s
and t. For more details, see Section 3.
Finally, we show one construction of a code C that satisfies the above requirements and is
efficiently decodable. The basic idea is to fix some q0 < q, first encode the messages s and t
using a random linear code C0 : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}n lg q0 , then encode each block of lg q0 bits using
a fixed linear code C1 : {0, 1}lg q0 → {0, 1}lg q. The code C1 is used to detect the errors made by
the q-ary symmetric channel; these corrupted blocks of bits are then treated as erasures, and we can
decode C0 by solving a linear system of equations, which can be done efficiently. Moreover, choosing
C0 to be a random linear encode ensures that, with high probability, C approaches the capacity of
the q-ary symmetric channel. For more details, see Section 4.
1.2 Outlook
The results of this paper can be summarized as follows: we construct OTM’s based on conjugate
coding, which achieve a fairly strong (“single-shot”) notion of security, are secure against general
LOCC adversaries, and can be implemented efficiently. These results are a substantial improvement
on previous work [1].
We view these results as a first step in a broader research program that aims to develop practical
implementations of isolated qubits, one-time memories, and ultimately one-time programs. We now
comment briefly on some different aspects of this program.
Experimental realization of isolated qubits is quite challenging, though there has been recent
progress in this direction [39, 40]. Broadly speaking, isolated qubits seem to be at an intermediate
level of difficulty, somewhere between photonic quantum key distribution (which already exists as a
commercial product), and large-scale quantum computers (which are still many years in the future).
Working with quantum devices in the lab also raises the question of fault-tolerance: can our
OTM’s be made robust against minor imperfections in the qubits? We believe this can be done, by
slightly modifying our OTM construction: we would use a slightly noisier channel to describe the
imperfect measurements made by an honest user, and we would choose the error-correcting code C
accordingly. The proof of security would still hold against LOCC adversaries who can make perfect
measurements. There is plenty of “slack” in the security bounds, to allow this modification to the
OTM’s.
In addition, one may wonder whether our OTM’s are secure against so-called “k-local” adversaries
[11], which can perform entangled measurements on small numbers of qubits (thus going outside the
isolated qubits model). There is some reason to be optimistic about this: while we have mainly
discussed separable adversaries in this paper, our security proof actually works for a larger set of
adversaries, who can generate entanglement among some of the qubits, but are still separable across
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the partition defined by the subset A (as described in the proof). Also, from a physical point of view,
k-local adversaries are quite natural. In particular, even when one can perform entangling operations
on pairs of qubits, it may be hard to entangle large numbers of qubits, due to error accumulation.
Finally, let us turn to the construction of one-time programs. Because our OTM’s leak some
information, it is not clear whether they are sufficient to construct one-time programs. There are a
couple of approaches to this problem. On one hand, one can try to strengthen the security proof,
perhaps by proving constraints on the types of information that an LOCC adversary can extract
from the OTM. We conjecture that, when our OTM’s are used to build one-time programs as in [3],
the specific information that is relevant to the security of the one-time program does in fact remain
hidden from an LOCC adversary.
On the other hand, one can try to strengthen the OTM constructions, in order to eliminate the
leakage. As noted previously, standard privacy amplification (e.g., postprocessing using a randomness
extractor) does not work in this setting, because the adversary also knows the seed for the extractor.
However, there are other ways of solving this problem, for instance by assuming the availability of
a random oracle, or by using something similar to leakage-resilient encryption [32, 33] (but with a
different notion of leakage, where the “leakage function” is restricted to use only LOCC operations,
but is allowed access to side-information).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
For any natural number n, let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let lg(x) = log2(x) denote the
logarithm with base 2.
For any random variable X , let PX be the probability density function of X , that is, PX(x) =
Pr[X = x]. Likewise, define PX|Y (x|y) = Pr[X = x|Y = y], etc. For any event E , define PEX to be
the probability density function of X smoothed by E , that is PEX(x) = Pr[X = x and E occurs].
We say that C is a binary code with codeword length n and message length k if C is a subset
of {0, 1}n with cardinality 2k. We say that C has minimum distance d = minx,y∈C dH(x, y), where
dH(·, ·) denotes the Hamming distance.
We say that C is a binary linear code if C is a linear subspace of GF (2)n. (Note, GF (2) and {0, 1}
denote the same set, but we will write GF (2) in situations where we use arithmetic operations.) In
this case, there exists a matrix G ∈ GF (2)k×n, such that the map x 7→ xTG is a bijection from
GF (2)k to the code subspace C. We will overload the notation and use C to denote the map
x 7→ xTG; then the codewords consist of the strings C(x) for all x ∈ GF (2)k.
2.2 The q-ary symmetric channel
The q-ary symmetric channel with error probability pe acts as follows: given an input x ∈ GF (q),
it returns an output y ∈ GF (q), with conditional probabilities Pr(y|x) = 1 − pe (if y = x) and
Pr(y|x) = pe/(q−1) (if y 6= x). The capacity of this channel, measured in q-ary symbols per channel
use, is given by [23]:
L(pe) = 1 + (1− pe) logq(1− pe) + pe logq(pe)− pe logq(q − 1)
= 1− h2(pe)
lg q
− pe lg(q − 1)
lg q
≥ 1− 1
lg q
− pe,
(2)
where h2(·) is the binary entropy function.
2.3 LOCC adversaries and separable measurements
An LOCC adversary is an adversary that uses only local operations and classical communication
(LOCC). Here, “local operations” consist of quantum operations on single qubits, and “classical
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communication” refers to the adversary’s ability to choose each single-qubit operation adaptively,
depending on classical information, such as measurement outcomes, that were obtained from previous
single-qubit operations. However, the adversary is not allowed to make adaptive choices that depend
on quantum information, or perform entangling operations on multiple qubits.
Formally, an LOCC adversary can be described as follows. Consider a system of n qubits. The
adversary makes a sequence of steps, labelled by i = 1, 2, 3, . . .. At step i, the adversary chooses one
of the qubits qi ∈ [n], and performs a general quantum measurementMi on that qubit; this returns
a measurement outcome, which is described by a classical random variable Zi. The adversary’s
choices of qi and Mi can depend on Z1, Z2, . . . , Zi−1. Also, note that the adversary can perform
weak measurements, and can measure the same qubit multiple times. Finally the adversary discards
the qubits, and outputs the sequence of measurement outcomes Z1, Z2, Z3, . . ..
A POVM measurement M = {Mz | z = 1, 2, 3, . . .} is called separable if every POVM element
Mz can be written as a tensor product of single-qubit operators. It is easy to see that any LOCC
adversary can be simulated by a separable measurement, i.e., for any LOCC adversary A, there
exists a separable POVM measurement M, such that for every quantum state ρ, the output of M
acting on ρ has the same distribution as the output of A acting on ρ [38].
2.4 Leaky OTM’s
We will use the following definition of a leaky OTM [1].
Definition 2.1. Fix some class of adversary strategies M, some leakage parameter δ ∈ [0, 1], and
some failure probability ε ∈ [0, 1]. A leaky one-time memory (leaky OTM) with parameters (M, δ, ε)
is a device that has the following behavior. Suppose that the device is programmed with two messages
s and t chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1}ℓ; and let S and T be the random variables containing
these messages. Then:
1. Correctness: There exists an honest strategy M(1) ∈ M that interacts with the device and
recovers the message s with probability ≥ 1 − ε. Likewise, there exists an honest strategy
M(2) ∈ M that recovers the message t with probability ≥ 1− ε.
2. Leaky security: For every strategy M∈ M, if Z is the random variable containing the classical
information output by M, then Hε∞(S, T |Z) ≥ (1− δ)ℓ.
Here Hε∞ is the smoothed conditional min-entropy, which is defined as follows [19, 20]:
Hε∞(X |Y ) = maxE: Pr(E)≥1−εminx,y
[
− lg[PEX|Y (x|y)]], (3)
where the maximization is over all events E (defined by the conditional probabilities PE|XY ) such
that Pr(E) ≥ 1− ε. Observe that a lower-bound of the form Hε∞(X |Y ) ≥ h implies that there exists
an event E with Pr(E) ≥ 1− ε such that, for all x and y, Pr[E , X = x|Y = y] ≤ 2−h.
The definition of a leaky OTM is weaker than that of an ideal OTM in two important respects:
it assumes that the messages s and t are chosen uniformly at random, independent of all other
variables; and it allows the adversary to obtain partial information about both s and t, so long as
the adversary still has (1− δ)k bits of uncertainty (as measured by the smoothed min-entropy). We
suspect that this definition of a leaky OTM is not strong enough to construct one-time programs
(although we conjecture that our actual constructions of OTM’s in Sections 3 and 4 are, in fact,
strong enough for this purpose).
2.5 Uncertainty relations for the min-entropy
We will use an uncertainty relation from [16], with a slight modification to describe quantum systems
that consist of many non-identical subsystems:
Theorem 2.2. Consider a quantum system with Hilbert space
⊗ℓ0
i=1C
di , i.e., the system can be
viewed as a collection of ℓ0 subsystems, where the i’th subsystem has Hilbert space dimension di.
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For each i ∈ [ℓ0], let Bi be a finite collection of orthonormal bases for Cdi , and suppose that these
bases satisfy the following uncertainty relation: for every quantum state ρ on Cdi , |Bi|−1
∑
ω∈Bi H(Pω) ≥
hi, where Pω is the distribution of measurement outcomes when ρ is measured in basis ω.
Now let ρ be any quantum state over
⊗ℓ0
i=1C
di , let Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θℓ0) be chosen uniformly at
random from B1 × · · · × Bℓ0 , and let X = (X1, . . . , Xℓ0) be the measurement outcome when ρ is
measured in basis Θ (i.e., each Xi is the outcome of measuring subsystem i in basis Θi).
Then, for any τ > 0, and any λ1, . . . , λℓ0 ∈ (0, 12 ), we have:
Hε∞(X |Θ) ≥ −τ +
ℓ0∑
i=1
(hi − λi), (4)
where ε ≤ exp(−2τ2/c), and c =∑ℓ0i=1 16(lg |Bi|diλi )2.
The proof is essentially the same as in [16]; it uses a martingale argument and Azuma’s inequality,
but it allows the martingale to have different increments at each step.
In addition, we will use the following chain rule for the smoothed min-entropy [20]:
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X |Y ) > Hε∞(X,Y )−H0(Y )− lg( 1ε′ ). (5)
3 One-time memories
We now show the correctness and security of the OTM construction described in Section 1.1. Recall
that this OTM uses n lg q qubits, stores two messages of length ℓ, and uses an error-correcting code
C. We will show how to set n and q, and how to choose the code C.
Let us introduce some notation. We view the code C as a function C : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}n lg q.
We view each codeword x ∈ {0, 1}n lg q as a sequence of n blocks, where each block is a binary
string of length lg q. We write the codeword as x = (xij)i∈[n],j∈[lg q], and we write the i’th block as
xi = (xij)j∈[lg q]. Finally, let H be the Hadamard gate acting on a single qubit.
We now prepare the qubits in the OTM as follows. For each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
• Let γi ∈ {0, 1} be the outcome of a fair and independent coin toss.
• If γi = 0, prepare the i’th block of qubits in the state |C(s)i〉.
• If γi = 1, prepare the i’th block of qubits in the state H⊗(lg q)|C(t)i〉.
To recover the first message s, we measure every qubit in the standard basis, which yields a string of
measurement outcomes z ∈ {0, 1}n lg q, and then we run the decoding algorithm for C. To recover the
second message t, we measure every qubit in the Hadamard basis, obtain a string of measurement
outcomes z, and again run the decoding algorithm for C.
We will prove the following general theorem, which works for any code C that satisfies certain
properties:
Theorem 3.1. Let q ≥ 2 be any power of 2. Let Eq be the q-ary symmetric channel with error
probability pe = (1/2) − (1/2q). Let ℓ ≥ 1 and n ≥ 1, and let C : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}n lg q be any
error-correcting code that satisfies the following two requirements:
1. C can transmit information reliably over the channel Eq (where the channel treats each block
of lg q bits as a single q-ary symbol).
2. C is a linear code over GF (2).
Then the above OTM stores two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and has the following properties:
1. The OTM behaves correctly for honest parties.
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2. For any small constants 0 < λ≪ 12 , 0 < τ0 ≪ 1, and 0 < δ ≪ 1, the following statement holds.
Suppose the messages s and t are chosen independently and uniformly at random in {0, 1}ℓ.
For any separable adversary,3 we have the following security bound:
Hδ+ε∞ (S, T |Z)
≥
(
(12 − λ)− 4τ0 (1 + 1√lg q (1 + lg 1λ)) + (2− 1α )
)
· ℓ− lg 1δ
&
(
1
2 + (2− 1α )
)
· ℓ.
(6)
Here S and T are the random variables describing the two messages, Z is the random variable
representing the adversary’s measurement outcome, we have ε ≤ exp(−2τ20 ℓ/ lg q), and α =
ℓ/(n lg q) is the rate of the code C.
Note that, to get a strong security bound, one must use a code C whose rate α is large. It is
useful to ask, then, how large α can be. Let Lq denote the capacity of the channel Eq, measured in
q-ary symbols per channel use. Using a good code C, we can hope to have rate α ≈ Lq. Moreover,
Lq is lower-bounded by:
Lq ≥ 1− 1lg q − pe = 12 − 1lg q + 12q ≈ 12 , (7)
which is nearly tight when q is large. So we can hope to have α ≈ 12 , in which case our security
bound becomes:
Hδ+ε∞ (S, T |Z) & 12 ℓ. (8)
3.1 Correctness for honest parties
We first show the “correctness” part of Theorem 3.1. Without loss of generality, suppose we want to
recover the first message s. (A similar argument applies if we want to recover the second message t.)
Let z ∈ {0, 1}n lg q be the string of measurement outcomes obtained by measuring each qubit in the
standard basis. Observe that z is the output of a q-ary symmetric channel Eq with error probability
pe = (1/2) − (1/2q), acting on the string C(s) ∈ {0, 1}n lg q (viewed as a sequence of n symbols in
GF (q)). Since the code C can transmit information reliably over this channel, it follows that we can
recover s.
3.2 Security against separable adversaries
We now show the “security” part of Theorem 3.1. Let us first introduce some notation (see Figure
1). Suppose the OTM is programmed with two messages s and t that are chosen independently and
uniformly at random in {0, 1}ℓ. Let S and T be the random variables representing these messages.
Let Γ be the random variable representing the coin flips γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) used in programming the
OTM. C denotes the error-correcting code, which maps {0, 1}ℓ to {0, 1}n lg q. “Select” is an operation
that maps {0, 1}n lg q × {0, 1}n lg q to {0, 1}n lg q, depending on the value of Γ, as follows:
Select(x, y)i,j =
{
xi,j if Γi = 0,
yi,j if Γi = 1,
for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [lg q]. (9)
“Select” outputs a string of n lg q classical bits, which are converted into n lg q qubits (in the standard
basis states |0〉 and |1〉). H denotes a Hadamard gate controlled by the value of Γ; that is, for each
i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [lg q], if Γi = 1, then H is applied to the (i, j)’th qubit.
Fix any separable adversary A, let L be the number of possible outcomes that can be observed
by the adversary, and let M = {Mz | z ∈ [L]} be the separable POVM measurement performed by
the adversary. Let Z be the random variable representing the adversary’s output; so Z takes values
in [L].
3Note that this includes LOCC adversaries as a special case.
8
Coin flips Γ
Message S
Message T
C
Select
C
s
H
s
Adversary A Z [Z = z]
Fictional A(f) Q [Q = 0]
Figure 1: OTM with separable adversary A, and “fictional” adversary A(f). In the proof, we will
analyze the distributions of S and T conditioned on the events Z = z and Q = 0.
Fix some small constant δ > 0. We say that a measurement outcome z ∈ [L] is “negligible”
if Pr[Z = z] ≤ (δ/2n lg q) tr(Mz). Note that the probability of observing any of these “negligible”
measurement outcomes is small:
Pr[Z is “negligible”] =
∑
z “negl.”
Pr[Z = z] ≤ (δ/2n lg q)
∑
z “negl.”
tr(Mz) ≤ δ. (10)
The proof will proceed as follows: for all messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and for all measurement outcomes
z ∈ [L] that are not “negligible,” we will upper-bound Pr[S = s, T = t|Z = z]. This will imply a
lower-bound on Hδ∞(S, T |Z), which is what we desire.
3.2.1 A fictional adversary
We begin by fixing some measurement outcome z ∈ [L] that is not “negligible.” Since the adversary
performed a separable measurement, we can write the corresponding POVM element Mz as a tensor
product of single-qubit operators. In particular, we can write Mz = tr(Mz)
⊗n
i=1
⊗lg q
j=1 Rij , where
each Rij is a single-qubit operator, positive semidefinite, with trace 1.
We now construct a fictional adversary A(f), which we will use in the proof. The fictional
adversary acts in the following way: for each qubit (i, j) ∈ [n] × [lg q], it performs the POVM
measurement {Rij , I −Rij} on qubit (i, j), which yields a binary measurement outcome Qij (where
Qij = 0 corresponds to the POVM element Rij , and Qij = 1 corresponds to I − Rij). Let us write
the vector of measurement outcomes as Q = (Qij)i∈[n], j∈[lg q], which takes values in {0, 1}n lg q. Let
0 denote the vector (0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1}n lg q.
Intuitively, the event Q = 0 (in an experiment using the fictional adversary) corresponds to the
event Z = z (in an experiment using the real adversary). More precisely, for any s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, we
have
PST |Z(s, t|z) =
PZ|ST (z|s, t)PST (s, t)
PZ(z)
=
PQ|ST (0|s, t) tr(Mz)PST (s, t)
PQ(0) tr(Mz)
= PST |Q(s, t|0).
(11)
We will proceed by upper-bounding PST |Q(s, t|0) (with the fictional adversary); this will imply an
upper-bound on PST |Z(s, t|z) (with the real adversary).
3.2.2 Properties of the codewords C(S) and C(T )
Recall that the messages S and T are independently and uniformly distributed in GF (2)ℓ. Now
consider the codewords C(S) and C(T ). We claim that there exists a subset of ℓ coordinates of C(S)
and C(T ) that are independently and uniformly distributed in GF (2)ℓ.
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Figure 2: In order to understand the behavior of the fictional adversary, conditioned on the event
QA = 0, we consider an analogous experiment, where the state
⊗
(i,j)∈ARij is measured in a random
basis. We will analyze this using an entropic uncertainty relation.
To see this, recall that C is a linear code overGF (2). Hence the encoding operation C : GF (2)ℓ →
GF (2)n lg q can be written in the form C(x) = xTG for some matrix G ∈ GF (2)ℓ×n lg q. Since the
codewords C(x) are all distinct, the matrix G must have row-rank ℓ. Hence the column-rank of G
must also be ℓ, so there exists a subset of ℓ columns of G that are linearly independent over GF (2).
Let us denote this subset by A ⊂ [n]× [lg q], |A| = ℓ.
Now look at those coordinates of C(S) and C(T ) that correspond to the subset A; we write these
as C(S)A = (C(S)ij)(i,j)∈A and (C(T )ij)(i,j)∈A. It follows that C(S)A and C(T )A are independently
and uniformly distributed in GF (2)ℓ.
3.2.3 Behavior of the fictional adversary on the subset of qubits A
We now analyze the behavior of the fictional adversary on those qubits belonging to the subset
A. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the fictional adversary measures the qubits in
the subset A first, and then measures the remaining qubits in the subset ([n] × [lg q]) \ A. (This
follows because the fictional adversary is non-adaptive, in that it makes all its decisions about what
measurements to perform, before seeing any of the results of the measurements; and because all of
the measurements commute with one another, since each measurement only involves a single qubit.)
For convenience, let B = ([n] × [lg q]) \ A. Let QA = (Qij)(i,j)∈A denote the measurement
outcomes of the qubits in the subset A, and let QB = (Qij)(i,j)∈B denote the measurement outcomes
of the qubits in the subset B.
We claim that the OTM’s coin tosses Γ, conditioned on the event QA = 0, are still uniformly
distributed in {0, 1}n. This is a fairly straightforward calculation; see Appendix A.1.1 for details.
3.2.4 Using the uncertainty relation
We will upper-bound these probabilities PST |ΓQA(s, t|γ, 0), using an entropic uncertainty relation.
The basic idea is to consider another experiment, where one runs the OTM and the fictional adversary
“backwards” in time. This experiment can be analyzed using the uncertainty relation in Theorem
2.2 (originally due to [16]).
We now describe this new experiment (see Figure 2). One prepares the quantum state
⊗
(i,j)∈A Rij ,
one chooses a uniformly random sequence of measurement bases Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn) (where Θi = 0
denotes the standard basis and Θi = 1 denotes the Hadamard basis), and then one measures each
qubit (i, j) ∈ A in the basis Θi to get a measurement outcome Xij (which can be either 0 or 1).
Intuitively, the state
⊗
(i,j)∈A Rij corresponds to the fictional adversary’s measurement outcome
QA = 0, the random bases Θ correspond to the OTM’s coin flips Γ, and the measurement outcomes
X correspond to those bits C(S)A and C(T )A used in the OTM. (Note that the OTM’s coin flips Γ
are uniformly distributed, even when one conditions on the event QA = 0, as shown in the previous
section.)
To make this intuition precise, we will first show that:
Hε∞(S, T |Γ, QA = 0) = Hε∞(X |Θ) + ℓ. (12)
(See Appendix A.1.2 for details.) Then note that conditioning on Γ can only reduce the entropy,
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Figure 3: Efficient codes for the q-ary symmetric channel, based on erasure coding and error detection.
hence we have: 4
Hε∞(S, T |QA = 0) ≥ Hε∞(X |Θ) + ℓ. (13)
We then use Theorem 2.2 to show a lower-bound on Hε∞(X |Θ); see Appendix A.1.3 for details.
3.2.5 Combining all the pieces
The fictional adversary’s complete sequence of measurement outcomes is denoted by Q = (QA, QB).
So far we have analyzed the adversary’s actions on those qubits belonging to the subsetA, and we have
shown a lower-bound on Hε∞(S, T |QA = 0). Now, we will show a lower-bound on Hε∞(S, T |Q = 0).
To do this, we bound the adversary’s actions on the subset B in a more-or-less trivial way, using the
fact that Pr[Q = 0] = Pr[Z = z]/ tr(Mz) ≥ δ/2n lg q, since z was assumed to be “non-negligible.”
We will then consider the real adversary, and show a lower-bound on Hδ+ε∞ (S, T |Z). Here we use
the following identity that relates the real adversary and the fictional adversary (see equation (11)):
Hε∞(S, T |Z = z) = Hε∞(S, T |Q = 0). (14)
Finally we combine these results to prove the theorem; see Appendix A.1.4 for details.
4 Efficient implementations of one-time memories
In the previous section, we showed that one-time memories can be constructed from any code that
approaches the capacity of the q-ary symmetric channel, and is linear over GF (2). In this section, we
will construct codes that have these properties, and moreover can be encoded and decoded efficiently.
Using these codes, we will get efficient implementations of one-time memories.
There are several known constructions for codes that approach the capacity of the q-ary symmetric
channel, and are efficiently decodable [22, 23, 24]. To illustrate how these techniques can be applied
in our setting, we will describe one simple approach, which is based on erasure coding and error
detection [23]. (See Figure 3.)
The basic idea is to take the message s, encode it using a code C0 that outputs a string of q0-ary
symbols (where q0 < q), and then encode each q0-ary symbol using a code C1 that outputs a q-ary
symbol. The code C1 is used to detect errors made by the q-ary symmetric channel; once detected,
these errors can be treated as erasures. The code C0 is then used to correct these erasures, which is
relatively straightforward. For instance, we can choose C0 to be a random linear code; then we can
decode in the presence of erasure errors by solving a linear system of equations, which we can do
efficiently.
We now describe the construction in detail. Let k ≥ 2 be an integer, let pe ∈ (0, 1), and choose
any small constants 0 < ε≪ 1, 0 < δ ≪ 1 and 0 < θ ≪ 1. Define:
n =
⌊
k
1− pe − θ
⌋
, (15)
4 Note that, for all s and t, PE′ST |QA(s, t|0) =
∑
γ PE′ST |ΓQA(s, t|γ, 0)PΓ|QA(γ|0) ≤ 2
−ℓ2−h. This implies (13).
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q = 2c, c = lg q =
⌊
2
δ
⌋ ⌈
εn+ lg(npe)
⌉
, (16)
q0 = 2
c0, c0 = lg q0 =
⌈
2
δ − 2
⌉ ⌈
εn+ lg(npe)
⌉
. (17)
Note that our setting is slightly unusual, in that we will be constructing codes for the q-ary symmetric
channel where q is not fixed. In particular, lg q (the number of bits used to describe each q-ary symbol)
grows polynomially with the codeword length n, which is proportional to the message length k.
We will construct a code C : {0, 1}k lg q0 → {0, 1}n lg q as follows:
1. Choose a uniformly randommatrixG0 ∈ GF (2)k lg q0×n lg q0 , and define a code C0 : {0, 1}k lg q0 →
{0, 1}n lg q0 by setting C0(s) = sTG0.
2. Fix any full-rank matrix G1 ∈ GF (2)lg q0×lg q, and define a code C1 : {0, 1}lg q0 → {0, 1}lg q by
setting C1(v) = v
TG1.
3. Define C(s) = C1 ◦ C0(s), where we view C0(s) ∈ {0, 1}n lg q0 as a sequence of n blocks of
lg q0 bits, and C1 acts separately on each of these blocks. Equivalently, we can write C(s) =
sTG0(
⊕n
i=1G1), where
⊕n
i=1G1 denotes a direct sum of n copies of the matrix G1.
We use the following decoding algorithm:
1. Given a string z ∈ {0, 1}n lg q, write it as a sequence of n blocks of lg q bits: z = (zij)i∈[n],j∈[lg q].
2. For each i ∈ [n], try to decode the q-ary symbol zi ∈ {0, 1}lg q, i.e., try to find some v ∈ {0, 1}lg q0
such that C1(v) = zi. Let bi be the result (or set bi = ∗ if zi lies outside the image of C1).
Thus we get a string b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) ∈
({0, 1}lg q0 ∪ {∗})n.
3. Try to decode the string b, treating the ∗ symbols as erasures, i.e., try to find some a ∈
{0, 1}k lg q0 such that, for all i ∈ [n] such that bi 6= ∗, and for all j ∈ [lg q], C0(a)ij = bij . If a
solution exists, output it; if there are multiple solutions, choose any one of them and output
it; otherwise, abort.
Finally, we introduce some more notation. Let us choose a message (represented by a random
variable S) uniformly at random in {0, 1}k lg q0 . Let Eq be the q-ary symmetric channel with error
probability pe. We take the message S, encode it using the code C, transmit it through the channel
Eq, then run the decoding algorithm, and get an estimate of the original message; call this Sˆ.
We prove the following statement (see Appendix B.1 for details):
Theorem 4.1. Let k ≥ 2 be an integer, let pe ∈ (0, 1), and choose any small constants 0 < ε ≪ 1,
0 < δ ≪ 1 and 0 < θ ≪ 1. Let us construct the code C : {0, 1}k lg q0 → {0, 1}n lg q as described above.
Then C has the following properties:
1. With high probability (over the choice of the random matrix G0), C can transmit information
reliably over the q-ary symmetric channel Eq with error probability pe.
More precisely, choose any small constant τ such that 0 < τ < θ, and choose any large constant
λ ≫ 1. Then, with probability ≥ 1 − 1λ (over the choice of G0), the code C can transmit
information over the channel Eq, and the probability of decoding failure is bounded by:
Pr[Sˆ 6= S] ≤ λ(e−2τ2n + 2−εn + 2(−nθ+nτ+1) lg q0) ≤ e−Ω(n). (18)
2. C is a linear code over GF (2).
3. C has rate α := k lg q0n lg q ≥ (1 − pe − θ)(1 − δ). (Note that this approaches the capacity of the
channel Eq, as shown in equation (2), when q is large.)
4. The encoding and decoding algorithms for C run in time polynomial in n lg q. (Also note that
lg q grows at most linearly with n, and n is proportional to k.)
Finally, we can take the code C constructed above (for pe =
1
2 ), and combine it with the OTM
construction of Theorem 3.1, to get the following result:
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Corollary 4.2. For any k ≥ 2, and for any small constant 0 < µ ≪ 1, there exists an OTM con-
struction that stores two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, where ℓ = Θ(k2), and has the following properties:
1. The OTM behaves correctly for honest parties.
2. The OTM can be implemented in time polynomial in k.
3. Let 0 < δ ≪ 1 be any small constant. Suppose the messages s and t are chosen independently
and uniformly at random in {0, 1}ℓ. For any separable adversary,5 we have the following
security bound:
Hδ+ε∞ (S, T |Z) ≥ (12 − µ) ℓ− lg 1δ . (19)
Here S and T are the random variables describing the two messages, Z is the random variable
representing the adversary’s measurement outcome, and we have ε ≤ exp(−Ω(k)).
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A One-time memories
A.1 Security against separable adversaries
A.1.1 Behavior of the fictional adversary on the subset of qubits A
We claim that the OTM’s coin tosses Γ, conditioned on the event QA = 0, are still uniformly
distributed in {0, 1}n. To see this, we first write PQA|ΓST as follows:
PQA|ΓST (0|γ, s, t) =
∏
(i,j)∈A
tr(Rij ρ(C(s)ij , C(t)ij , γi)), (20)
where for all x, y, g ∈ {0, 1}, we define the single-qubit state ρ(x, y, g) by
ρ(x, y, g) =
{
|x〉〈x| if g = 0,
H |y〉〈y|H if g = 1. (21)
Next, we write PQA|Γ as follows:
PQA|Γ(0|γ) =
∑
s,t∈{0,1}ℓ
PQA|STΓ(0|s, t, γ)PST |Γ(s, t|γ)
=
∑
s,t∈{0,1}ℓ
4−ℓ
∏
(i,j)∈A
tr(Rij ρ(C(s)ij , C(t)ij , γi))
=
∑
a,b∈{0,1}A
4−ℓ
∏
(i,j)∈A
tr(Rij ρ(aij , bij , γi))
= 4−ℓ
∏
(i,j)∈A
2 tr(Rij) = 2
−ℓ,
(22)
where we used the following facts: Γ is independent of S and T ; PQA|STΓ(0|s, t, γ) only depends on
those coordinates of C(s) and C(t) corresponding to the subset A; these subsets of bits are uniformly
distributed in {0, 1}ℓ; and tr(Rij) = 1.
Then we can write PQA and PΓ|QA as follows:
PQA(0) =
∑
γ∈{0,1}n
PQA|Γ(0|γ) 2−n = 2−ℓ, (23)
PΓ|QA(γ|0) =
PQA|Γ(0|γ) 2−n
PQA(0)
= 2−n, (24)
which proves our claim.
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We will now calculate the probability distribution of the messages S and T , conditioned on the
OTM’s coin tosses Γ = γ and the adversary’s measurement outcomes QA = 0:
PST |ΓQA(s, t|γ, 0) =
PQA|STΓ(0|s, t, γ)PST |Γ(s, t|γ)
PQA|Γ(0|γ)
=
4−ℓ
∏
(i,j)∈A tr(Rij ρ(C(s)ij , C(t)ij , γi))
2−ℓ
= 2−ℓ
∏
(i,j)∈A
tr(Rij ρ(C(s)ij , C(t)ij , γi)),
(25)
where we used (20), (22), and the fact that the Γ is chosen independently of S and T .
A.1.2 Using the uncertainty relation
We will now show how Hε∞(S, T |Γ, QA = 0) and Hε∞(X |Θ) are related. We will proceed in several
steps. First, define the following function Φ : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}A,
Φij(s, t, γ) =
{
C(s)ij if γi = 0,
C(t)ij if γi = 1
(for all (i, j) ∈ A). (26)
Define a new random variable F = Φ(S, T,Γ), which takes values in {0, 1}A. (Intuitively, F is the
output of the “Select” function, restricted to those coordinates in the subset A.) We can write the
probability distribution of F as follows:
PF |ΓQA(f |γ, 0) =
∑
(s,t) : Φ(s,t,γ)=f
PST |ΓQA(s, t|γ, 0). (27)
How many terms are there in the sum in equation (27)? For any fixed f and γ, define the set
Efγ = {(s, t) ∈ {0, 1}2ℓ | Φ(s, t, γ) = f}. Note that we can view Φ(s, t, γ) = f as a set of ℓ linear
constraints on s and t. In particular, these constraints fix the values of a subset {(i, j) ∈ A | γi = 0}
of the coordinates of C(s) = sTG, and they fix the values of a subset {(i, j) ∈ A | γi = 1} of the
coordinates of C(t) = tTG. Recall from section 3.2.2 that the subset A of the columns of the matrix
G is linearly independent. Hence this set of linear constraints has rank ℓ, and so the set Efγ has size
|Efγ | = 2ℓ. (28)
Also, note that we can write the distribution of S and T (from equation (25)) in the following
way:
PST |ΓQA(s, t|γ, 0) = 2−ℓ
∏
(i,j)∈A
tr(Rij H
γi |fij〉〈fij |Hγi), where f = Φ(s, t, γ). (29)
Notice that, if we pick (s, t) and (s˜, t˜) such that Φ(s, t, γ) = Φ(s˜, t˜, γ), then PST |ΓQA(s, t|γ, 0) =
PST |ΓQA(s˜, t˜|γ, 0). Hence all the terms in the sum in equation (27) are identical. So we can simplify
it as follows:
PF |ΓQA(f |γ, 0) =
∏
(i,j)∈A
tr(Rij H
γi |fij〉〈fij |Hγi). (30)
Furthermore, by comparing equations (29) and (30), we see that:
PST |ΓQA(s, t|γ, 0) = 2−ℓPF |ΓQA(f |γ, 0), where f = Φ(s, t, γ). (31)
Using equations (24) and (30), we can now see that (F,Γ) (conditioned on QA = 0) has the same
distribution as (X,Θ). This implies that:
Hε∞(F |Γ, QA = 0) = Hε∞(X |Θ). (32)
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Furthermore, using equation (31), we see that: 6
Hε∞(S, T |Γ, QA = 0) = Hε∞(X |Θ) + ℓ. (34)
Finally, note that conditioning on Γ can only reduce the entropy, hence we have: 7
Hε∞(S, T |QA = 0) ≥ Hε∞(X |Θ) + ℓ. (35)
A.1.3 Using the uncertainty relation, part 2
We now use Theorem 2.2 to show a lower-bound on Hε∞(X |Θ).
Recall that the qubits in the OTM are arranged in n blocks, each of size lg q. The set A describes
a subset of these qubits, which are contained in a subset of the blocks. Let Λ be the set of blocks that
contain one or more qubits that lie in the set A, that is, let Λ = {i ∈ [n] | ∃j ∈ [lg q] s.t. (i, j) ∈ A}.
For each i ∈ Λ, let Ai be the set of qubits in the i’th block that lie in the set A, that is, let
Ai = {j ∈ [lg q] s.t. (i, j) ∈ A}. So we have A =
⋃
i∈Λ {i} ×Ai. Let ℓ0 = |Λ|, and let ℓi = |Ai|; then
we have ℓ =
∑
i∈Λ ℓi.
Using the terminology of Theorem 2.2, we have a quantum system that consists of ℓ0 subsystems,
where the i’th subsystem consists of ℓi qubits and has dimension di := 2
ℓi . For each subsystem i ∈ Λ,
we have a set Bi that contains two orthonormal bases for (C
2)⊗ℓi , namely the standard basis and
the Hadamard basis. These satisfy the following uncertainty relation [35, 36]: for every quantum
state ρ on (C2)⊗ℓi , |Bi|−1
∑
ω∈Bi H(Pω) ≥ ℓi/2 =: hi, where Pω is the distribution of measurement
outcomes when ρ is measured in basis ω.
Now let ρ be the quantum state
⊗
(i,j)∈ARij , let Θ = (Θi)i∈Λ be a sequence of measurement bases
chosen uniformly at random from
∏
i∈ΛBi, and let X = (Xi)i∈Λ be the sequence of measurement
outcomes when ρ is measured in the bases Θ (i.e., each Xi is the outcome of measuring subsystem i
in basis Θi).
Then, for any τ > 0, and any λi ∈ (0, 12 ) (for all i ∈ Λ), we have:
Hε∞(X |Θ) ≥ −τ +
∑
i∈Λ
(hi − λi), (36)
where ε ≤ exp(−2τ2/c), and c =∑i∈Λ 16(lg |Bi|diλi )2.
Now fix some small constants 0 < λ ≪ 12 and 0 < τ0 ≪ 1. Set λi = λ (for all i ∈ Λ), and set
τ = τ0
√
ℓ/ lg q
√
c. Then we have:
Hε∞(X |Θ) ≥ 12ℓ− λℓ0 − τ, (37)
where ε ≤ exp(−2τ20 ℓ/ lg q). We can upper-bound τ as follows:
τ = τ0
√
ℓ/ lg q · 4
(∑
i∈Λ
(1 + ℓi + lg
1
λ )
2
)1/2
≤ τ0
√
ℓ/ lg q · 4
(
(
∑
i∈Λ
ℓ2i )
1/2 + (1 + lg 1λ)
√
ℓ0
)
≤ 4τ0
√
ℓ/ lg q
(√
lg q
√
ℓ+ (1 + lg 1λ)
√
ℓ
)
= 4τ0ℓ
(
1 + 1√
lg q
(1 + lg 1λ)
)
,
(38)
6 This involves a tedious calculation. Let h = Hε∞(X|Θ). Equation (32) implies that there exists an event E , with
probability Pr[E|QA = 0] ≥ 1 − ε, such that for all f and γ, PEF |ΓQA(f |γ, 0) ≤ 2
−h. This event E is defined by the
conditional probabilities Pr[E|F = f,Γ = γ,QA = 0]. We now define a new event E
′ which has conditional probabilities
Pr[E ′|S = s, T = t,Γ = γ,QA = 0] = Pr[E|F = Φ(s, t, γ),Γ = γ, QA = 0]. (33)
A straightforward calculation then shows that Pr[E ′|QA = 0] ≥ 1− ε, and for all s, t and γ, PE′ST |ΓQA(s, t|γ, 0) ≤ 2
−ℓ2−h.
This implies equation (34).
7 Note that, for all s and t, PE′ST |QA(s, t|0) =
∑
γ PE′ST |ΓQA(s, t|γ, 0)PΓ|QA(γ|0) ≤ 2
−ℓ2−h. This implies (35).
17
where we used the triangle inequality for the ℓ2 norm, and the bounds ℓi ≤ lg q,
∑
i∈Λ ℓi = ℓ and
ℓ0 ≤ ℓ. Plugging this in above, and again using the bound ℓ0 ≤ ℓ, we get that:
Hε∞(X |Θ) ≥ (12 − λ)ℓ − 4τ0ℓ
(
1 + 1√
lg q
(1 + lg 1λ)
)
. (39)
A.1.4 Combining all the pieces
First, we will show a lower-bound on Hε∞(S, T |Q = 0). For any s, t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, we can upper-bound
PST |Q as follows:
PST |Q(s, t|0) =
PQB |STQA(0|s, t, 0)PST |QA(s, t|0)
PQB |QA(0|0)
≤ PST |QA(s, t|0)
PQB |QA(0|0)
= PST |QA(s, t|0)
Pr[QA = 0]
Pr[Q = 0]
.
(40)
From equation (23), we know that Pr[QA = 0] = 2
−ℓ. From the construction of the fictional adversary
in section 3.2.1, we know that Pr[Q = 0] = Pr[Z = z]/ tr(Mz), where Z is the output of the real
adversary. Finally, since z was assumed to be “non-negligible,” we know that Pr[Z = z]/ tr(Mz) ≥
δ/2n lg q. Combining these facts, we get that
PST |Q(s, t|0) ≤ PST |QA(s, t|0)
2n lg q
δ 2ℓ
, (41)
hence we conclude that
Hε∞(S, T |Q = 0) ≥ Hε∞(S, T |QA = 0)− n lg q + ℓ− lg(1/δ). (42)
Note that the real adversary and the fictional adversary are related as follows (see equation (11)):
Hε∞(S, T |Z = z) = Hε∞(S, T |Q = 0). (43)
Combining equations (43), (42), (35) and (39), we get that:
Hε∞(S, T |Z = z) ≥ Hε∞(S, T |QA = 0)− n lg q + ℓ− lg(1/δ)
≥ Hε∞(X |Θ) + 2ℓ− n lg q − lg 1δ
≥ (12 − λ)ℓ − 4τ0ℓ
(
1 + 1√
lg q
(1 + lg 1λ)
)
+ 2ℓ− n lg q − lg 1δ .
(44)
Note that the above bounds hold for any measurement outcome z that is “non-negligible.” More-
over, the probability of observing a “non-negligible” measurement outcome is at least 1 − δ (by
equation (10)). So we conclude that:
Hδ+ε∞ (S, T |Z) ≥ (12 − λ)ℓ − 4τ0ℓ
(
1 + 1√
lg q
(1 + lg 1λ)
)
+ 2ℓ− n lg q − lg 1δ . (45)
We can write this bound in a simpler form. First, recall that we assumed the code C has rate
α > 0, i.e., ℓ ≥ αn lg q. Then we have:
Hδ+ε∞ (S, T |Z) ≥
(
(12 − λ)− 4τ0 (1 + 1√lg q (1 + lg 1λ)) + (2− 1α )
)
· ℓ− lg 1δ . (46)
Typically we will let λ, τ0 and δ be small constants. We will consider the asymptotic behavior as
ℓ→ ∞, we will let q be large, and we will choose a family of codes C that approaches the capacity
of the q-ary symmetric channel; then α ≈ 12 . Then we have the following bound:
Hδ+ε∞ (S, T |Z) & 12ℓ. (47)
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B Efficient implementations of one-time memories
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
First, we show that the code C can transmit information reliably over the q-ary symmetric channel Eq
with error probability pe. Let us introduce some more random variables to describe the intermediate
results of this process:
S
Encode C0−−−−−−−→ V Encode C1−−−−−−−→ X Channel Eq−−−−−−−→ Z Decode C1−−−−−−−→ B Decode C0−−−−−−−→ Sˆ. (48)
Here the message S takes values in {0, 1}k lg q0 , V takes values in {0, 1}n lg q0 , X and Z take values
in {0, 1}n lg q, B takes values in ({0, 1}lg q0 ∪ {∗})n, and Sˆ takes values in {0, 1}k lg q0 .
Note that there are multiple sources of randomness in this picture: the code C is constructed
using a random matrix G0, the message S is chosen at random, and the channel Eq makes random
errors. We will use the following notation. Expressions without subscripts, such as Pr[Sˆ 6= S], denote
probabilities summed over all possible choices of the message S and all possible actions of the channel
Eq; however, these expressions are still random variables that depend on the choice of the code C.
Expressions with a subscript C, such as PrC
[
Pr[Sˆ 6= S] ≥ δ], denote probabilities summed over all
possible choices of the code C.
First, consider the action of the channel Eq. Let Ne be the number of errors made by the channel
(where each corrupted q-ary symbol counts as a single error), that is,
Ne = |{i ∈ [n] s.t. Zi 6= Xi}|. (49)
Note that ENe = npe. Choose any constant τ such that 0 < τ < θ. Define r := n(pe + τ), and note
that by Hoeffding’s inequality, Pr[Ne > r] ≤ e−2τ2n.
Now consider the decoding algorithm for the code C1. Let Nude be the number of errors that are
not detected by C1, that is,
Nude = |{i ∈ [n] s.t. Bi 6= ∗ and Bi 6= Vi}|. (50)
Note that, for any i ∈ [n], we have Pr[Bi 6= ∗ and Bi 6= Vi] = pe(q0 − 1)/(q − 1). Using the union
bound, we have that Pr[Nude > 0] ≤ npe(q0 − 1)/(q − 1). Finally, using equations (16) and (17),
note that
q0 − 1
q − 1 ≤
q0
q
=
1
2c−c0
, c− c0 ≥ εn+ lg(npe). (51)
Combining these facts, we get the bound Pr[Nude > 0] ≤ 2−εn.
Thus we can write:
Pr[Sˆ 6= S] ≤ Pr[Ne > r or Nude > 0] + Pr[Sˆ 6= S and Ne ≤ r and Nude = 0]
≤ e−2τ2n + 2−εn + Pr[Sˆ 6= S and Ne ≤ r and Nude = 0].
(52)
Now consider the case where Ne ≤ r and Nude = 0. We will analyze the decoding process for the
code C0. Look at the random variable B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn), which is the input to the decoder. We
know that at most r of the coordinates Bi are ∗ symbols, and those coordinates Bi that are not ∗
symbols must be equal to the corresponding coordinates Vi. We introduce some notation: for any
b ∈ ({0, 1}lg q0 ∪ {∗})n, let us define C−10 (b) to be the set of all possible messages that are consistent
with b, that is,
C−10 (b) = {t ∈ {0, 1}k lg q0 such that, ∀i ∈ [n] with bi 6= ∗, ∀j ∈ [lg q0], C0(t)ij = bij}. (53)
The decoding algorithm for C0 will search for any message in the set C
−1
0 (B). Note that the correct
message S lies inside C−10 (V ), which is contained in C
−1
0 (B). A decoding failure Sˆ 6= S implies that
there must exist some other message t ∈ C−10 (B) such that t 6= S.
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So we can write:
Pr[Sˆ 6= S and Ne ≤ r and Nude = 0]
≤ Pr[(∃t ∈ C−10 (B) s.t. t 6= S) and Ne ≤ r and Nude = 0]
≤ Pr[∃t ∈ C−10 (B) s.t. t 6= S | Ne ≤ r]
= 2−k lg q0
∑
s∈{0,1}k lg q0
Pr[∃t ∈ C−10 (B) s.t. t 6= S | S = s and Ne ≤ r]
≤ 2−k lg q0
∑
s∈{0,1}k lg q0
∑
t∈{0,1}k lg q0\{s}
Pr[t ∈ C−10 (B) | S = s and Ne ≤ r]
= 2−k lg q0
∑
s∈{0,1}k lg q0
∑
t∈{0,1}k lg q0\{s}
∑
b∈({0,1}lg q0∪{∗})n
|{i∈[n] s.t. bi=∗}|≤r
1[t ∈ C−10 (b)] Pr[B = b | S = s and Ne ≤ r],
(54)
where in the third step we used the fact that the number of errors Ne made by the channel Eq is
independent of the message S.
We now calculate the expectation value of this quantity, averaging over the random choice of the
code C (that is, the random choice of the matrix G0). Note that 1[t ∈ C−10 (b)] is a random variable
that depends on C0(t) = t
TG0, and Pr[B = b | S = s and Ne ≤ r] is a random variable that depends
on C0(s) = s
TG0. Note that s 6= t implies that s and t are linearly independent (since s and t are
vectors over GF (2)); hence sTG0 and t
TG0 are independent random variables. So we can write:
EC
[
1[t ∈ C−10 (b)] Pr[B = b | S = s and Ne ≤ r]
]
= EC
[
1[t ∈ C−10 (b)]
]
EC
[
Pr[B = b | S = s and Ne ≤ r]
]
.
(55)
We can bound the first of these two factors as follows:
EC
[
1[t ∈ C−10 (b)]
]
= Pr
C
[t ∈ C−10 (b)]
= Pr
C
[∀i ∈ [n] with bi 6= ∗, ∀j ∈ [lg q0], C0(t)ij = bij ]
= 2−|{i∈[n] s.t. bi 6=∗}|·lg q0 ≤ 2−(n−r) lg q0 .
(56)
Substituting into equation (54), and using the bound k ≤ n(1 − pe − θ) + 1 from (15), we get
that:
EC Pr[Sˆ 6= S and Ne ≤ r and Nude = 0]
≤ 2−k lg q0
∑
s∈{0,1}k lg q0
∑
t∈{0,1}k lg q0\{s}
∑
b∈({0,1}lg q0∪{∗})n
|{i∈[n] s.t. bi=∗}|≤r
2−(n−r) lg q0 EC
[
Pr[B = b | S = s and Ne ≤ r]
]
< 2k lg q02−(n−r) lg q0
≤ 2(n(1−pe−θ)+1−n+n(pe+τ)) lg q0
= 2(−nθ+nτ+1) lg q0 .
(57)
Plugging into equation (52), we get:
EC Pr[Sˆ 6= S] ≤ e−2τ
2n + 2−εn + 2(−nθ+nτ+1) lg q0 . (58)
Finally, Markov’s inequality implies that, for any λ≫ 1,
Pr
C
[
Pr[Sˆ 6= S] ≥ λ(e−2τ2n + 2−εn + 2(−nθ+nτ+1) lg q0)] ≤ 1
λ
. (59)
This proves the first part of Theorem 4.1.
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We now show the remaining parts of the theorem. It is clear from the construction that C is a
linear code over GF (2). The rate of the code C can be bounded as follows, using equations (16) and
(17):
α :=
k lg q0
n lg q
≥ (1 − pe − θ) lg q0
lg q
= (1− pe − θ)c0
c
≥ (1− pe − θ)(1 − δ). (60)
Finally, note that the encoding procedure for C consists of matrix multiplications over GF (2), while
the decoding procedure can be implemented by solving linear systems of equations overGF (2); hence
both procedures take time polynomial in n lg q. (Also note that lg q grows at most linearly with n,
and n is proportional to k.) This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
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